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REPORT 
Number 7--0ctober 1970 
Montana Constitutional Revision Issues in 1970 
ELLIS WALDRON 
Professor of Poli tic al Science and 
Director of the Bureau of Government Research 
University of Montana 
Montana political leaders have made an unprece-
dented appeal for voter support this November to 
modernize the state's archaic system of government. 
The 1969 Legislative Assembly by large majorities 
in each house, and the Governor, have submitted 
four propositions to the people for possible ratifica-
tion: 
1. Referendum 67 would authorize a constitutional 
convention to review the basic structure of state and 
local government for the first time since the 1880s 
and propose a new constitution for possible ratifica-
tion in 1972. 
·2. Two proposed amendments to the present con-
stitution would open the way for reorganization of 
the state's executive and administrative apparatus, 
whether or not the voters approve writing a new 
constitution. 
3. A third proposed constitutional amendment 
would give more youthful citizens meaningful access 
to the "political country" by lowering the voting age 
to 19 years. 
American political arrangements are experiencing 
unprecedented strains imposed by the cumulative, 
quickening and uneven impact of science and tech-
nology on every aspect of our lives. The fruits of 
chemistry and electronics alter not only the way we 
live, eat and produce; as they change basic physical 
conditions of life, they also alter the equally impor-
tant notions we have about what constitute reason-
able standards of life for ourselves as individuals 
and in groups. Small wonder that governmental 
leaders, seeking responsible conduct of public af-
fairs with institutions and understandings largely 
inherited from the 18th and 19th centuries, judge 
some of the political apparatus to be inadequate for 
the job. 
There has been notable quickening of interest in 
constitutional reform of state government in the past 
decade, and Montana joins at least 33 other states 
taking "some form of official action directed toward 
general revision of their basic instruments of govern-
ment" in the past two years.* 
*Albert L. Sturm, "State Constitutions and Constitutional 
Revision, 1967-1969," The Book of the States, 1970- 1971, 
p . 3, Lexington ( 1970). 
I hope that Montana voters will approve Referen-
dum 67 and both constitutional amendments relating 
to executive reorganization on November 3. Refer-
endum 67 and either of the executive reorganization 
amendments could stand alone as a route to govern-
ment modernization, regardless of the fate of the 
other proposals. But none of the three is incompati-
ble with the others; as a package they afford alter-
native and complementary routes to achievement of 
a state government more suited to 21st-century con-
ditions than the charter we have inherited from the 
1880s. 
As a teacher of university students for more than 
three decades, the writer also favors adoption of the 
19-year-old vote. While the substantive impact of the 
younger vote is apt to be minimal because younger 
voters will tend to divide along about the same lines 
as their elders, the style of politics and government 
may change a bit in efforts to involve the young in 
meaningful and constructive acts of citizenship. 
Why State Constitutions Grow Older Quicker 
How does it happen that most of the states are en-
gaged in a restless search for "modernization" of 
their government apparatus while most citizens 
would agree that the national government structure 
erected nearly 200 years ago has proven to be viable 
and reasonably competent to deal with contemporary 
conditions? 
In Montana, citizens' committees on the executive, 
legislature and judiciary, a wide spectrum of groups 
ranging from the major political parties through 
business, labor and professional groups, women's and 
religious organizations have spoken out in favor of 
changing the state's constitution either by drafting a 
new document or by amending the existing charter 
in basic ways. Yet few voices are heard here or else-
where to propose major changes in Congress, the 
presidency or the federal court system-whatever 
differences exist over national policies. 
The aura of sanctity that has grown up around the 
national constitution conceived by the "Founding 
Fathers" at Philadelphia in 1787 has not shielded 
most state constitutions from criticism nor from 
fairly frequent change. Louisiana has had 10 state 
constitutions, Georgia eight, New York, Florida and 
South Carolina six each. 
The greater durability and acceptability of the na-
tional constitution of 1787 is usually attributed to 
its concise, general language that has allowed con-
gress, the president and the courts repeatedly to re-
interpret it to fit contemporary needs. While this is 
true, there is another reason why the national char-
ter has been more durable than state constitutions. 
It does not diminish the stature of the men who 
created the national constitution to note that their 
task was different, and simpler, than that faced by 
draftsmen of state constitutions. Washington and 
Franklin, Madison and Morris, and the others who 
got the job done during that hot summer in Phila-
delphia, knew what they most wanted. The 13 states 
were going concerns, handling problems of property 
and everyday life with a rich complex of institutions 
inherited from England and adapted to American 
conditions over a period of 150 years. But the re-
cently-ousted king must be replaced by an effective 
central power that could create a common market and 
single currency within the new nation, regulate its 
foreign trade and relations, and maintain a common 
defense. 
The purpose of the national constitution was to 
create and allocate powers for a national government 
and define its relationship to the already existing 
states. So Congress was given broad, generalized 
authority to tax, borrow, spend and pass laws "neces-
sary and proper" for the well-understood main ob-
jectives. An executive of singular but untried au-
thority was directed to enforce the laws, manage the 
common defense and conduct foreign relations. A 
Supreme Court was created to standardize interpre-
tation of the new national laws. Congress would 
decide later whether a separate system of lower fed-
eral courts would be required, and the Bill of Rights 
was tacked on as an afterthought to get votes for 
ratification of the main package. There have been 
only 14 formal amendments since 1800 and none of 
these has altered the basic structure in any signifi-
cant way. 
Meanwhile the 1780 Massachusetts stat'e constitu-
tion has been amended 91 times; New York has had 
six constitutions, and Pennsylvania four since state-
hood in 1776. 
The states have a different problem: by tradition 
and political evolution that preceded nationhood, 
their governments can do whatever they are not pro-
hibited from doing. A state constitution, after cre-
ating the basic machinery of state and local govern-
ment, spells out what these governments may not do. 
It withholds powers. State constitutions, particularly 
those of the 19th century (Montana notably in-
cluded) are replete with "Thou Shalt Nots," restrict-
ing executives, legislatures, courts and local govern-
ments from engaging in whatever abuses were cur-
rently most common, or most commonly decried, 
among the citizenry. State constitutions fill up with 
detailed proscriptions, and read like tracts for their 
particular time. 
Moreover, there is apt to be a time lag in this sort 
of lawmaking. The Montana Constitution, written 
late in the Railroad Era, borrowed from other states 
a dozen provisions seeking to limit the worst abuses 
of railroad politics and finance. Like most state con-
stitutions of its time, it locked the barn doors against 
state and local support of "internal improvements" 
just as inventors were figuring out how to propel a 
carriage with a gas engine instead of a horse. Within 
a few years the internal-combustion revolution liber-
ated people from the field and farm and required a 
system of public roads. People followed their goods 
to the cities and urbanization came quickly on the 
heels of revolutions in agriculture and transporta-
tion. State constitutions had to be rewritten or re-
interpreted to unlock the barn doors so highways 
could be built and cities served and governed. 
Referendum 67: 
To Authorize a Constitutional Convention 
In last position on the November ballot, this refer-
endum affords the most comprehensive but least pre-
dictable approach to modernizing the state constitu-
tion. The voters will cast their ballots for or against 
"calling a constitutional convention." More precisely 
the question is "whether the legislative assembly at 
the 1971 session, and in accordance with Article XIX, 
section 8 of the Montana constitution, shall call a 
convention to revise, alter or amend the constitution 
of Montana." 
The constitution provides that "if a majority of 
those voting on the question shall declare in favor of 
such convention, the legislative assembly shall at its 
next session provide for the calling thereof." 
The constitution (Article XIX, section 8) is also 
specific about certain steps that must follow a favor-
able referendum vote: 
1) the next legislature must fix the time and 
place for the convention to meet, and provide for its 
expenses and for the payment of its members and 
officers. 
The time for election of convention delegates is not 
specified, nor is the method of their nomination ex-
pressly stated. But when the election is held: 
2) the number of delegates in the convention must 
equal the number of members in the state -house of 
representatives, and they must be "elected in the 
same manner, at the same places, and in the same 
districts as those representatives." 
3) Convention delegates must have the qualifica-
tions of state senators: United States citizenship, 24 
years of age, and residence in the county or election 
district for a year preceding election. 
4) The convention must begin work within three 
months of the election. 
5) Its members, bound by the usual oath of office, 
may "prepare such revisions, alterations or amend-
ments to the constitutions as may be deemed neces-
sary." 
6) The convention's product "shall be submitted to 
the electors for their ratification or rejection at an 
election appointed by the convention for that pur-
pose." This apparently could be an election at a 
special time, or an election conducted at the same 
time as a primary or general election. 
7) The ratification election must be held at least 
two months, but not more · than six months, after 
adjournment of the convention. 
8) "A majority of the electors voting at the elec-
tion must approve" any "revision, alteration or 
amendment" for it to take effect. 
The present constitution fortunately leaves many 
details to be determined by the legislature, including 
the time for electing delegates and starting the con-
vention. Since the 1971 legislative assembly must re-
apportion itself (or be reapportioned by some court) 
to population in the 1970 census, the constitutional 
convention doubtless must reflect the composition of 
the newly reapportioned house of representatives. 
The 1971 legislature probably would establish some 
sort of preparatory commission to perform staff work 
and prepare for the convention. And nomination and 
election of delegates must take place. Thus the con-
vention would probably meet in the early months of 
1972, if it is decided that the vote on ratification of a 
new constitution should be held in connection with a 
regular election. 
Although the constitution requires convention del-
egates to be elected "in the same manner- as state 
representatives," it is silent about nomination proc-
esses and the legislature would decide whether the 
delegates should be elected on partisan or nonparti-
san ballot. 
If service as a delegate to a constitutional conven-
tion is regarded as holding a "civil office under the 
state," legislators would be disqualified from service 
as delegates (Article V, section 7, Montana Constitu-
tion). Litigation might be required to resolve this 
question. It would be unfortunate for legislators to 
be disqualified from service, although many citizens 
may be expected to court the distinction of serving 
in a constitutional convention who could not, or 
would not seek service in the legislative assembly. 
A critical element in the success of constitutional 
revision is the effort, or lack of effort, made by a 
convention to "sell" its product to the voters on rati-
fication. Montana's two-to-six month waiting period 
after convention adjournment would appear to allow 
ample time for such efforts. 
There is no certainty that the final product of a 
convention would be better than the present consti-
tution; it could be worse. In any event, the voters 
have final judgment on the work of a convention. 
It has been argued here that state constitutions re-
flect the needs and concerns of particular times; we 
have indeed lost faith in our political processes if we 
are unwilling to try for a more appropriate charter 
of contemporary government than the constitution of 
1889. The reapportionment revolution of the past 
decade has made representative bodies more "repre-
sentative" than at any time in a half-century; the 
press and other media in Montana are perhaps more 
open to discussion of public issues than at any time 
in at least a generation; and a substantial measure of 
economic diversification in some areas of the state 
furnishes a base for vigorous exploration of fiscal 
and governmental alternatives appropriate to our 
time. 
The Executive Reorganization Amendments 
The second and third proposed amendments to the 
present constitution that will appear on the Novem-
ber ballot relate to reorganization of the executive 
and administrative structure of the state govern-
ment. 
1) The Twenty-Agency Amendment 
This proposed amendment, third in place among 
the issues on the November ballot, would authorize 
the most direct approach to reorganization of the 
executive branch of state government-something 
that ranks high on most Montana checklists of 
needed constitutional changes. 
The proposed amendment would add a new section 
to the Constitution: • 
"Section _______ . All executive and administrative 
offices, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies and 
instrumentalities of the executive department of 
state government and their respective functions, 
powers, and duties, except for the office of gover-
nor, lieutenant governor, secretary of the state, at-
torney general, state treasurer, state auditor, and 
superintendent of public instruction, shall be allo-
cated by law among and within not more than 
twenty (20) departments by no later than July 1, 
1973. Subsequently, all new powers or functions 
shall be assigned to departments, divisions, sections, 
or units in such manner as will tend to provide an 
orderly arrangement in the administrative organi-
zation of state government . Temporary commissions 
may be established by law and need not be allocated 
within a principal department." 
Amid the complexities of rr,odern government, the 
best and only hope to keep it responsive to the needs 
of the people is to establish clear lines of authority 
and responsibility. Government agencies and officers 
must have authority equal to the tasks demanded of 
them, and citizens must know who is responsible for 
getting things done and whom to blame if things are 
done badly or not at all. 
Montana government frustrates this principle of 
clear organization and responsibility at many points, 
but nowhere more than in the executive branch. The 
1389 constitution creates a plural executive of seven 
state officers elected independently for four-year 
terms, and entrenches a number of boards and agen-
cies in the language of the basic charter. Besides, 
where the state government in 1889 had about 
twenty boards and agencies, the most recent count 
has identified 161-added year after year to "solve" 
new or emerging problems. 
Governor Anderson has described work amidst 
these agencies as an "administrative nightmare" and 
his Commission on Executive Reorganization notes 
"duplication of effort, waste and inefficiency" suffi-
cient to convince the 1969 senate to vote unanimously 
for proposal of this 20-agency amendment. Only five 
of the 104 state representatives opposed its submis-
sion to the voters for ratification. 
The 20-agency reorganization approach is consid-
ered to have worked well in Colorado and Florida 
where it has been tried; and the Montana Executive 
Reorganization Commission expects tax savings and 
improved service to follow reduction of overlapping 
agencies and of duplicated, inefficient performance 
of services. 
The 20-agency amendment leaves untouched, the 
spectrum of elective state officers who share execu-
tive authority with the governor. 
2) The "Continuing Reorganization" Amendment 
The second proposed amendment to appear on the 
November ballot might also be called an "extra 
amendments" amendment. Its purpose is to make 
reorganization of the executive branch easier to put 
on the ballot, and to facilitate a continuing effort of 
this sort through several bienniums. 
The present article of the constitution governing 
amendments (Article XIX, section 9) concludes with 
this restriction: 
that not more than three amendments to this. con-
stitution shall be submitted at the same election. 
The proposed amendment would add the following 
temporary exception to this limit: 
that there may be submitted at each of the general 
elections held in the years 1972, 1974 and 1976, in 
addition to the three amendments otherwise author-
ized by this section, an amendment or amendments 
providing for the reorganization of the executive 
department of government which may include the 
revision or repeal of sections of this constitution 
relating to any boards, offices, and departments 
other than legislative and judicial offices. The re-
organization of the executive department is a single 
subject, and an additional amendment relating to 
that subject authorized by this section may be sub-
mitted to the qualified electors of the state in the 
form of a title clearly expressing its subject. 
The Montana constitution is more difficult to 
amend than many, primarily because of its three-
amendment limitation. An earlier Public Affairs Re-
port (Number 4, October 1968: "Constitutional Issues 
in 1968") explored the effects of this limitation: each 
legislative chamber favors its own proposals over 
those of the other so that three amendment proposals 
seldom reach the ballot. "Tinkering" amendments 
reach the ballot because they attract little opposition 
while those proposing fundamental changes in ma-
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chinery of government attract resistance. Over the 
years Montana voters have not been more hostile to 
ratification of proposed amendments than voters 
elsewhere. In 1968, however, they narrowly rejected 
an amendment to allow as many as six amendment 
proposals in any election; and other amendments to 
extend legislative sessions from 60 to 80 days, and 
to allow increase of salaries of public officials during 
their term of office were defeated by substantial 
margins. 
This proposed amendment would circumvent the 
restrictive provision for three successive bienniums, 
for the limited purpose of facilitating executive re-
organization. It would reITIJ)ve any doubt whether 
detailed amendments would be required to rearrange 
the executive structure which is defined in provisions 
scattered throughout the constitution. By declaring 
executive reorganization to be a single subject, a 
limited series of comprehensive amendments would 
suffice to cover the entire matter. 
This amendment, proposed in tandem with the 20-
agency amendment, seems to say: the broad scope 
of administrative reorganization under the governor 
might proceed under the first proposal while the 
legislature and the people work out whether there is 
continuing need for some of the elective state offices 
and constitutional boards. The reorganization at 
large need not be at the mercy of a combination of 
special interests mobilized to defend particular 
boards and offices entrenched in the constitution 
four-score years ago. 
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